Justification logics are modal-like logics with the additional capability of recording the reason, or justification, for modalities in syntactic structures, called justification terms. Justification logics can be seen as explicit counterparts to modal logic. The behavior and interaction of agents in distributed system is often modeled using logics of knowledge and time. In this paper, we sketch some preliminary ideas on how the modal knowledge part of such logics of knowledge and time could be replaced with an appropriate justification logic.
Introduction
Justification logics [AF12] are epistemic logics that feature explicit reasons for an agent's knowledge and belief. Originally, Artemov developed justification logic to provide a constructive semantics for intuitionistic logic. Later this type of logics was introduced into formal epistemology, where it provides a novel approach to several epistemic puzzles and problems of multi-agent systems [Art06, Art08, Art10, BKS11a, BKS11b, KS12, AK14, BKS14, KMOS15]. Instead of an implicit statement ϕ, which stands for the agent knows ϕ, justification logics include explicit statements of the form [t]ϕ, which mean t justifies the agent's knowledge of ϕ.
A common approach to model distributed systems of interacting agents is using logics of knowledge and time, with the interplay between these two modalities leading to interesting properties and questions [FHMV95, vdMW03, HvdMV04] . While knowledge in such systems has typically been modeled using the modal logic S5, it is a natural question to ask what happens when we model knowledge in such logics using a justification logic.
In the following, we will sketch some preliminary ideas towards such a logic, and indicate further necessary work with appropriate questions. After briefly introducing the syntax in Section 2, we propose an axiomatization in Section 3, including possible additional principles. The resulting logic is illustrated with the proof of some simple properties in Section 4. Finally, we introduce interpreted systems as the chosen semantics in Section 5 and we show soundness in Section 6, where the question of completeness is also briefly addressed. The paper concludes with additional questions and remarks regarding further directions of research in Section 7.
Syntax
In the following, let h be a fixed number of agents, Const a given set of proof constants, Var a given set of proof variables, and Prop a given set of atomic propositions..
The set of justification terms Tm i for agent 1 ≤ i ≤ h is defined inductively by
where c i ∈ Const i and x i ∈ Var i . The set of formulae Fml is inductively defined by
where 1 ≤ i ≤ h, t i ∈ Tm i and P ∈ Prop. We use the following usual abbreviations
Associativity and precedence of connectives, as well as the corresponding omission of brackets, are handled in the usual manner.
Axioms
The axiom system for temporal justification logic consists of three parts, namely propositional logic, temporal logic, and justification logic.
Propositional Logic
For propositional logic, we take 0. all propositional tautologies (Prop)
as axioms and the rule modus ponens, as usual:
Temporal Logic
For the temporal part, we use [Gor99] (see also Section A), with axioms
and rules
We use LTL to denote the Hilbert system given by the axioms and rules for temporal logic above, plus the axioms and rules for propositional logic.
Justification Logic
Finally, for the justification logic, we use the counterpart to the multi-agent version of the modal logic S5, i.e., J5 h (cf. [Rub06] ), with axioms
where the constant specification CS is a set of formulae [c] i ϕ, where c ∈ Const i is a proof constant and ϕ is an axiom. We call a constant specification CS axiomatically appropriate, if for every axiom ϕ and agent i, there is a constant c ∈ Const i such that [c] i ϕ ∈ CS.
For a given constant specification CS, we use J5LTL CS to denote the Hilbert system given by the axioms and rules for propositional logic, temporal logic, and justification logic as presented above. Question 1. What can be done using the following variant of constant necessitation?
[
Additional Principles
In J5LTL, epistemic and temporal properties do not interact. It is therefore a natural question to consider some of the following principles, which create a connection between time and knowledge. We assume the language for terms to be augmented in the obvious way.
which, in turn, using ( -k) and propositional reasoning gives ϕ → ϕ .
By propositional reasoning and using (1) we obtain the desired ϕ → ϕ from this.
2. The following is a valid instance of (ind)
Using (2) from the first item, ( -nec), and modus ponens we immediately get the desired result. Now, we show how ( -access) can be proved using ( -access) and ( -left).
Lemma 2. For every agent i, formula ϕ and term t there is a term s(t) such that
Proof. Using propositional logic, we can combine the two given principles
and the following instance of the principle proved in the first item of the previous lemma
and we are done.
Question 3. Can we prove ( -access) from ( -access) without using ( -left)?
In contrast to the previous deductions, in the following we require our constant specifications to be axiomatically appropriate.
Lemma 3. Let CS be an axiomatically appropriate constant specification. For every agent i, formula ϕ and term t there is a term s(t) such that
as these are valid instances of a propositional axiom, (mix), and (ind), respectively.
Using (application) and modus ponens, we obtain
Using ( -nec), this gives
From (generalize), (application), and modus ponens, we obtain
Using (application) and modus ponens two more times, we finally get
Note that the previous proof relies on the fact that agents can "internalize" deductions. This so-called internalization theorem holds in general and is a typical and fundamental property of justification logics.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the derivation of ϕ.
In case ϕ is an axiom, the claim is immediate by (const-nec).
In case ϕ was derived by modus ponens from ψ → ϕ and ψ, then, by induction hypothesis, there are term s 1 and s 2 such that [s 1 ] i (ψ → ϕ) and [s 2 ]ψ are provable. Using (application) and modus ponens, we obtain [s 1 · s 2 ] i ϕ.
In case ϕ is [c] i ψ, derived using (const-nec), we can use (positive introspection) and modus ponens in order to obtain
In case ϕ is ψ, derived using ( -nec), then, by induction hypothesis, there is a term s such that [s] i ψ is provable. Now, we can use ( -nec) in order to obtain [s] i ψ and then (generalize) and modus ponens to get
Finally, if ϕ is ψ, derived using ( -nec), then, as above, we obtain [⇑ s] i ψ and then use ( -access) and modus ponens to get
Corollary 1. Let CS be an axiomatically appropriate constant specification. If
Question 4. Is internalization provable without these additional principles?
Semantics
Let L be some set of local states. A global state is a (h+1)-tuple l e , l 1 , . . . , l h ∈ L h+1 . A run r is a function from N to global states, i.e., r : N → L h+1 . Given a run r and n ∈ N, the global state (r, n) is called a point. A system is a set R of runs.
Let CS be a constant specification. An interpreted system I for CS is a tuple (R, E, ν) where
• R is a system,
Given two points (r, n) and (r ′ , n ′ ), we define (r, n)
A CS-admissible evidence function E i is a function satisfying the following conditions. For all terms t, s ∈ Tm and all points (r, n) and (r ′ , n ′ ),
Given an interpreted system I = (R, E, ν) for CS, a run r ∈ R and n ∈ N, we define validity of a formula ϕ in I at point (r, n) inductively by (I, r, n) P iff P ∈ ν(r, n) , (I, r, n) ⊥ , (I, r, n) ϕ → ψ iff (I, r, n) ϕ or (I, r, n) ψ , (I, r, n) ϕ iff (I, r, n + 1) ϕ , (I, r, n) ϕ iff (I, r, n + i) ϕ for all i ≥ 0 , (I, r, n) ϕ U ψ iff there is some m ≥ 0 such that (I, r, n + m) ψ and (I, r, n + i) ϕ for all 0 ≤ i ≤ m ,
We call an interpreted system strong if it has the following additional property
As usual, we write I ϕ if (I, r, n) ϕ for all points (r, n), and we write CS ϕ if I ϕ for all strong interpreted systems I for CS. Question 5. While in modal epistemic logic, S5 is typically used, i.e., the accessibility relation is usually an equivalence relation (as ∼ i is here), justification logic is more at home with the justification counterpart to S4. In order to achieve this, would it be possible to extend interpreted systems with additional, explicit accessibility relations
which are transitive and reflexive? In particular, this would allow dropping the strong evidence requirement.
Soundness
Theorem 2 (Soundness). Let CS be a constant specification.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the derivation of ϕ. Let I be a system and (r, n) a point.
If ϕ is a propositional axiom or derived using modus ponens, the result follows as usual.
In the case of ( -k), assume (I, r, n) (ϕ → ψ) and (I, r, n) ϕ. Then we have (I, r, n + 1) ϕ → ψ and (I, r, n + 1) ϕ. Thus, (I, r, n + 1) ψ and we are done.
In the case of ( -k), assume (I, r, n) (ϕ → ψ) and (I, r, n) ϕ. Then we have (I, r, n + i) ϕ → ψ and (I, r, n + i) ϕ for all i ≥ 0. Thus, (I, r, n + i) ψ for all i ≥ 0 and we are done.
In the case of (fun), we have (I, r, n) ¬ϕ if and only if (I, r, n + 1) ¬ϕ if and only if (I, r, n + 1) ϕ if and only if (I, r, n) ϕ if and only if (I, r, n) ¬ ϕ .
In the case of (mix), assume (I, r, n) ϕ. Then we have (I, r, n + i) ϕ for all i ≥ 0. In particular, we have (I, r, n) ϕ. Furthermore, we also have (I, r, n + 1 + j) ϕ for all j ≥ 0. Thus, (I, r, n + 1) ϕ, which means (I, r, n) ϕ and we are done. In the case of (ind), assume (I, r, n) (ϕ → ϕ) and (I, r, n) ϕ. Then we have (I, r, n + i) ϕ → ϕ) for all i ≥ 0. By induction on i, we can prove (I, r, n + i) ϕ using (I, r, n) ϕ for the induction basis and (I, r, n + i) ϕ → ϕ) for all i ≥ 0 for the induction step. This yields the desired result. In the case of ( U 1), assume (I, r, n) ϕ U ψ. Thus we have that there is an m ≥ 0 such that (I, r, n + m) ψ and (I, r, n + i) ϕ for all 0 ≤ i ≤ m. In particular, (I, r, n + m) ψ and thus (I, r, n) ♦ψ.
In the case of ( U 2), for the direction from left to right, assume (I, r, n) ϕ U ψ. Thus we have that there is an m ≥ 0 such that (I, r, n + m) ψ and (I, r, n + i) ϕ for all 0 ≤ i ≤ m. If m = 0, we have (I, r, n) ψ and we are done. If m > 0, we have (I, r, n) ϕ, (I, r, n+1+(m−1)) ψ and (I, r, n+j for all 0 ≤ j ≤ m − 1. Thus (I, r, n + 1) ϕ U ψ and, in turn, (I, r, n) (ϕ U ψ). In the case of ( U 2), for the direction from right to left, assume (I, r, n) ψ ∨ (ϕ ∧ (ϕ U ψ)). If (I, r, n) ψ, the result follows immediately. If (I, r, n) ϕ ∧ (ϕ U ψ), we have that there is an m ≥ 0 such that (I, r, n + 1 + m) ψ and (I, r, n + 1 + i) ϕ for all 0 ≤ i ≤ m. Thus, (I, r, n + (m + 1)) ψ and (I, r, n + i) ϕ for all 0 ≤ i ≤ (m + 1) and we are done.
In the case of ( -nec), by induction hypothesis we have CS ϕ. In particular, this means (I, r, n + 1) ϕ and we are done.
In the case of ( -nec), by induction hypothesis we have CS ϕ. In particular, this means (I, r, n + i) ϕ for all i ≥ 0 and we are done.
In the case of (application), assume (I, r, n) [t] i (ϕ → ψ) and (I, r, n) [s] i ϕ. Thus, we have ϕ → ψ ∈ E i (r, n, t) and ϕ ∈ E i (r, n, s). This gives us ψ ∈ E i (r, n, t · s) and the result follows from the strong evidence condition.
In the first case of (sum), assume (I, r, n)
[t] i ϕ. Thus, we have ϕ ∈ E i (r, n, t) ⊆ E i (r, n, t + s). This gives us (I, r, n) [t + s] i ϕ by the strong evidence condition. The second case follows analogously.
In the case of (reflexivity), assume (I, r, n) [t] i ϕ. Thus we have (I, r ′ , n ′ ) ϕi for all (r ′ , n ′ ) with (r, n) ∼ i (r ′ , n ′ ). In particular, (r, n) ∼ (r, n), and therefore (I, r, n) ϕ and we are done.
In the case of (positive introspection), assume (I, r, n)
[t] i ϕ. Thus we have, ϕ ∈ E i (r, n, t). From the closure conditions on evidence functions we get [t] i ϕ ∈ E i (r, n, !t). The strong evidence condition then gives us the desired
In the case of (negative introspection), assume (I, r, n) ¬ [t] i ϕ. by the strong evidence condition, ϕ ∈ E i (r, n, t). Thus, ¬ [t] i ϕ ∈ E i (r, n, ?t). Now, strong evidence again gives us (I, r, n)
Finally, the case of (const-nec) is immediate by the corresponding closure condition on evidence functions and strong evidence.
Lemma 4.
( -access) is sound for interpreted systems
for all points (r, n), agents i, formulae ϕ and terms t.
(generalize) is sound for interpreted systems
( -access) is sound for interpreted systems
( -right) is sound for interpreted systems
( -left) is sound for interpreted systems
Proof.
1. Assume (I, r, n)
[t] i ϕ. Then ϕ ∈ E i (r, n, t). Thus, ϕ ∈ E(r, n+k, ⇓ t) fo all k ≥ 0. By strong evidence, we get (I, r, n+k) [⇓ t]ϕ for all k ≥ 0 and the result follows.
Assume (I, r, n)
[t] i ϕ. Then (I, r, n + k) [t] i ϕ for all k ≥ 0. Thus, ϕ ∈ E i (r, n+ k, t) for all k ≥ 0. Therefore, ϕ ∈ E i (r, n, ⇓ t) and we obtain the result by strong evidence.
and we obtain the result by strong evidence.
4. Assume (I, r, n) [t] i ϕ. Then, ϕ ∈ E i (r, n, t). Thus, ϕ ∈ E i (r, n+1, ⇛ t) and we obtain the result by strong evidence.
[t] i ϕ. Then ϕ ∈ E i (r, n+1, t). Thus, ϕ ∈ E i (r, n, ⇚ t) and we obtain the result by strong evidence.
Question 6. Do models satisfying these additional conditions exist at all? Question 7. Are there any (less obvious) semantic conditions guaranteeing soundness for these principles? Question 8. How can one show completeness? Adapting the proof from [HvdMV04] , where interpreted systems are obtained from a (finite) canonical model construction might be a feasible route, but the presence of might make it more cumbersome. Using infinite canonical models might require some form of model surgery, e.g., filtrations, as we are dealing with fixed points.
Conclusion
We have sketched an axiomatization for a justification logic of knowledge and time, discussed connecting principles between knowledge and time, illustrated the logic with sample derivations, and shown the internalization theorem and soundness. In the course of the presentation, we have raised questions indicating further directions of work. Most prominently, completeness proofs are currently missing.
Besides the questions posed above, there are various further routes of research such a logic might open. We will outline these questions in the following, in no particular order.
Question 9. Can one build Mkrtychev-style [Mkr97] interpreted systems? These would be models which do not require the accessibility relation ∼ i , but solely rely on the evidence function for determining knowledge.
Question 10. How can the typical examples, e.g., protocols related to message transmission, be formalized in the logic presented above? See, e.g., [HZ92] . For example, one might consider principles such as
Question 11. What happens if we require operations on justification terms to take time, e.g.,
This might also relate to the logical omniscience problem [AK14] .
Question 12. What does a justification logic for knowledge and branching time look like? See also [vdMW03] .
Question 13. Can dynamic justification logic be translated into temporal justification logic akin to [vDvdHR13] ? See also [BKS14] .
Finally, one might also wonder whether the temporal modalities themselves can be justified. This question is independent of the presentation above, more information can be found in Section C. Question 14. What would a justified temporal logic look like? by using ( -k) and (MP).
Using propositional reasoning we can combine (5) and (6) in order to obtain the desired χ → ϕ .
3. Immediate by using propositional reasoning and the contrapositive of ( U 1) which is ¬ψ → ¬(ϕ U ψ).
Combining these results, we obtain the following:
Proof. Assume χ → ¬ψ ∧ χ. By Lemma 6, item 2 we get χ → ¬ψ. Using Lemma 6, item 3 we get χ → ¬(ϕ U ψ) and we are done.
For the other direction, we have:
The following axioms and rules are derivable in LTL alt :
(ind)
Proof. Remember that is a defined connective in LTL alt , i.e., ϕ := ¬(⊤ U ¬ϕ).
1. The following is an instance of ( U 2)
Using propositional reasoning, this is equivalent to
Taking the contrapositive of this and using propositional reasoning and (fun), we obtain
which is the desired result
2. The following is an instance of ( U 1)
Taking the contrapositive, using propositional reasoning and (fun), we obtain
This has the form
where χ = ϕ ∧ (ϕ → ϕ). Hence we can use ( U -ind) in order to obtain
which is trivially equivalent to the desired (ind).
Finally, putting everything together, we obtain the desired equivalence. Proof. Immediate by induction on the derivation and using Lemma 7 and Lemma 6.
B Some Connecting Principles in Temporal Modal Logic
(KT5)
Finally, the following relationships hold between these principles and semantic notions:
• (pr) (strictly) implies (notquitepr),
• (pr) gives a sound and complete axiomatization for systems with perfect recall (with or without unique initial state),
• (prsync) gives a sound and complete axiomatization for synchronous systems with perfect recall (with or without unique initial state),
• (nl) gives a sound and complete axiomatization for systems with no learning (without unique initial state),
• (nlsync) gives a sound and complete axiomatization for synchronous systems with no learning without unique initial state,
• (pr) and (nl) give a sound and complete axiomatization for systems with perfect recall and no learning without unique initial state,
• (pr) and (nl) give a sound and complete axiomatization for single-agent (i.e., h = 1) systems with perfect recall and no learning with unique initial state),
• (prsync) and (nlsync) give a sound and complete axiomatization for synchronous systems with perfect recall and no learning without unique initial state,
• (prsync) and (nlsync) and (knowexch) give a sound and complete axiomatization for synchronous systems with no learning and with unique initial state (with or without perfect recall ),
• Systems with no learning and with unique initial state with more than one agent (i.e., h ≥ 2) do not have a recursive axiomatic characterization since the validity problem is co-r.e.-complete.
